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WHEN considering the thought of Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903) andSoren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), at the risk of sounding pedantic it is 
worth restating that the impact of religious thinkers in the nineteenth centu­
ry, even men such as these, was limited in scope by the state of technology 
of their times. Kierkegaard lived at a time before the railroad, when travel 
between the capitals of Europe by boat or horse-drawn coach constituted “the 
world” for most people, and Japan was still in legal isolation from the rest of 
the world. Although Kiyozawa lived to see the dawn of the twentieth centu­
ry, he died long before the advent of commercial airplanes, and never left 
Japan, not at all unusual for his generation. We know of Kierkegaard travel­
ing only to neighboring Germany and that it took considerable time for his 
works to be appreciated outside his native Denmark. Kiyozawa’s impact out­
side of Japan took even more time. Outside the distribution of his Skeleton of 
a Philosophy of Religion (hereafter Skeleton), in English, at one panel of the 
World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, an event with no appar­
ent impact, and despite some sporadic translations published in Japan, he does 
not attract the attention of non-Japanese scholars until the 1970s.
In short, these two men probably held only the simplest and most naive 
notions of what the other’s society was like, if they thought about them at all. 
And yet, when we compare their writings on core issues pertaining to the rela­
tionship between religion and ethics, despite coming from vastly different 
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spiritual traditions, they nan remarkably parallel. This similarity in their ideas 
begs the question of whether or not Kiyozawa might have known of the ear­
lier Kierkegaard and been influenced by his thought. In fact, as my investi­
gation below into this matter hopefully will show, there is evidence to suggest 
that Kiyozawa did know something of Kierkegaard, though it is far less cer­
tain that he grasped the themes of Kierkegaard’s project. But first we need to 
show the philosophical proximity of these two thinkers of such different reli­
gious backgrounds and to do this, I will present my understanding of their 
positions on one aspect of the important relationship between religion and 
ethics: how ethical concerns impact an individual’s spirituality. The correla­
tive issue of how religion impacts social morality, is also raised and one is 
struck again by the similarity of their approaches in that both are most explic­
it in framing this question in terms of how the ideal or “true” religious indi­
vidual views ethical and moral questions, rather than attempting to construct 
a broad, pragmatic theory of religion and ethics. My thesis is that both 
Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard inevitably see religion as not merely giving birth 
to and subsuming ethics through its position as the first cause of ethics, but 
ultimately swallowing ethics so thoroughly as to imply a deconstructing of 
the very notion of a viable, authoritative ethics, independent of religious expe­
rience. Their thinking on these matters is all the more radical considering the 
significant social pressure both men faced to take positions in support of eth­
ical norms that rationalized ecclesiastical and state authority.
Kierkegaard is not only the first so-called existential thinker that students 
typically read, but insofar as he has been canonized as the only philosophical 
author active in the first half of the nineteenth century to be so categorized, 
he is typically referred to, accurately or not, as the father or founder of the 
“modern” school of existentialist philosophy. More recently, the entire cate­
gory of “existentialism” has been put into question,1 but Kierkegaard’s voice 
remains compelling for many today. His employment of Hegel’s dialectic 
method to attack Hegel, his rational discourse in the service of deconstruct­
ing speculative metaphysics to argue for a quite irrational notion of faith, and 
his frequent use of the medium of fiction to make these arguments, have made 
1 Paul Ricoeur, while recognizing the impact of Kierkegaard on philosophy, has criticized 
this father-of-existentialism characterization of Kierkegaard as “pure illusion,” concluding that 
existentialism itself was never a valid rubric, in that most thinkers considered representative 
of existentialism, such as Marcel, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre, did not share a set of doc­
trines, methodology, or even the same questions. See Ree and Chamberlain 1998, pp. 10-12.
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Kierkegaard the focus of an entire subfield of philosophical inquiry, and the 
reader is directed to the continually growing mountains of Kierkegaard schol­
arship for a more thorough understanding of his thought than what I will be 
able to offer here. Both Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard are more easily under­
stood against the background of their times in terms of religion and society, 
and below I offer only the briefest overview of the lives of both men, before 
considering the way they responded to the problem of ethics and religion. 
Using Kierkegaard’s paradigm of three or four stages in the ethico-religious 
life of the individual, I will try to show that we can discern not only a paral­
lel approach in Kiyozawa’s writings, but nearly identical conclusions as well. 
Let us begin with Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard’s Assault on Christendom
Soren Kierkegaard was born into a successful merchant’s family in Denmark 
in 1813. His father was a devout Lutheran, and his family appears to have felt 
comfortable within the cultural fold of the Danish State Church. But his moth­
er, his sisters, and two of his brothers died before Soren reached the age of 
twenty-one, and this appears to have set him on a confrontational course with 
many of the religious and ethical presumptions with which he was raised. An 
impressive university student enrolled in a theology course, during those years 
his intellectual interests seem to have turned more toward philosophy and 
mythology. He managed to complete a master’s degree in theology and re­
ceived ordination as a Lutheran minister, and though he later wrote that he 
repeatedly intended to become “a rural pastor” after finishing one book or 
another, in fact Kierkegaard never made a serious effort to take up that path.2 
Quite the contrary, the criticisms of his native Danish Church he penned in 
his youth did not dissipate as he grew older. These led to personal attacks on 
him in local newspapers and only served to deepen his alienation from that 
institution. In the end, Kierkegaard accepted the reality that his religious voice 
lay in writing, albeit one that took a stand toward his church and European 
Christianity in general that could often be merciless in its disparagement. 
Although we know that he spent considerable time in young adulthood enjoy­
ing the sensual side of life, Kierkegaard never married. Indeed, his sudden 
breaking off of his engagement in 1840 to the beautiful seventeen year-old 
Regine Olson, seems to have signaled a kind of awakening for him, as he was 
2 Based on a draft of “The Accounting” in On My Work as an Author, as quoted in 
Kierkegaard 1992, p. 154.
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to comment later that his failure to complete the marriage revealed to him his 
own lack of faith.
Kierkegaard lived in a place and time when overt criticism of the church 
was considered unseemly. His many essays critical of Christianity as it was 
practiced in Europe—he claimed, for example, that genuine Christianity 
could not be found in the Danish Church—caused him considerable person­
al difficulties, which in turn contributed to his poor health and no doubt served 
as a causal factor in his early death. Although he published a considerable 
amount, during his lifetime Kierkegaard was essentially unknown outside his 
native Denmark and never escaped a lifelong financial dependence upon the 
inheritance provided by his father. It was not until the end of the nineteenth 
century that Kierkegaard’s ideas began to receive significant attention on the 
international stage, largely through their influence on Ibsen, and it was not 
until the 1920s that his major works became accessible in German, French, 
English, and Japanese translations.
Kierkegaard’s writings all present philosophical discourses, but often 
communicated by means of fictional dialogues published under different 
pseudonyms. Although he called these his “indirect communication,” many 
have become classics of today’s philosophical canon. Perhaps, the best read 
of this genre is The Sickness unto Death, published under the name Anti- 
Climacus. This is an investigation into the awareness or consciousness of self 
and its relation to God, where the individual’s alienation from the truth of God 
is glossed as undying despair. Those works he signed his name to, his “direct 
communication,” are where scholars have traditionally sought his views on 
ethics and religion. But these days most students of Kierkegaard do not dis­
tinguish between the representative nature of the two categories of his writ­
ing, and it is often in the “indirect” works that sentiments on issues closest to 
the concerns of Kiyozawa are found, particularly Either/Or, Fear and 
Trembling, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, The Concept of Anxiety, and 
The Sickness unto Death. Yet, it was not until the posthumously published 
The Point of View for my Work as an Author that Kierkegaard explained that 
“I am and always was a religious author, that the whole of my work as an 
author is related to Christianity, to the problem of becoming a Christian.” The 
similarities to this statement are obvious in Kiyozawa’s famous essay, “Waga 
shinnen (My Faith),” where he confesses his outlook has always been 
that of a Pure Land Buddhist.
Like Kiyozawa, in his youth Kierkegaard was extremely taken with Kant 
and Hegel, but if he dove into philosophy in hopes of finding a system of ideas 
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to replace the dogma of the Danish Lutheran Church, he came up empty-hand­
ed, for as he aged his alienation from both philosophers, particularly Hegel, 
grows. Such distancing is only implicit in Kiyozawa’s work, but I think we 
can infer a similar frustration in Kiyozawa with the idealism of Kant and the 
rationalism of Hegel, and this is particularly evident in his later writings on 
ethics. It is interesting that their methodology is not affected, however; even 
after their disaffection is apparent, neither Kierkegaard nor Kiyozawa wanes 
in their use of the Hegelian dialectical form of argument.
Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel is one way to understand the core values 
lying at the base of his views on ethics and religion, most explicit in his 
rejection is the latter’s sense of a “Universal” characterized by rationality. In 
his Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
Kierkegaard attacks Hegel’s presumption that there are rational laws 
impelling change in human experience, a principle that implies only a corre­
sponding inevitability to human behavior and its resultant history, both seen 
as a necessarily dialectical movement within a natural evolution of this prin­
ciple. This presumes not only a corresponding inevitability to human histo­
ry, but also a rational principle for everything judged meaningful in personal 
experience. By contrast, Kierkegaard saw meaning for the individual as a per­
sonal discovery uncovered within one’s own subjectivity. The influence of 
Kant’s system of universals is implied in Kierkegaard’s dispute with Hegel, 
for Kant’s insistence that all principles of reason must be universally applic­
able to all people in similar situations, is similarly at odds with Kierkegaard’s 
esteem of the authority of the individual and his self-consciousness.
While asserting that any status-quo would inevitably “transition” into 
something else in the course of history, Hegel’s basic affirmation of the social 
status-quo as something “meant to be” and thereby a source of authority is 
anathema to Kierkegaard. This is clear from his rather unforgiving criticism 
of social institutions and the human impulse to identify with them. In his 
notion of Sittlichkeit, Hegel subsumes individual ethical understanding in a 
broad, societal-based emphasis on accepted universal norms, something akin 
to what today we would call “politically correct” norms of behavior. 
Kierkegaard sees this presumption first as unreliable, since public thinking is 
often erroneous and pernicious for the individual in that it ignores his partic­
ular situation. This analysis emerges from Kierkegaard’s own experience, 
which taught him that spiritual awakening within individuals is only possible 
when they realize their alienation from such norms of behavior. This con­
clusion marks Kierkegaard as having broken from his contemporaries who 
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were, by and large, more interested in “scientific” or systematic approaches 
that ignored exceptions.3 In addition to their common insistence on the need 
for individual realization as the basis for religio-ethical existence, Hegel, 
Kant, Kierkegaard, and Kiyozawa all share a distrust of pure empiricism con­
sistent with basic Buddhist notions of perception. In the search for an author­
ity of knowledge, Hegel finds it in social and legal convention. As such, he 
affords the State a position of ultimate moral authority, summed up in his 
famous dictum: “The history of the world is the judgment of the world.” The 
social justification of common morality, found in Hegel’s The Philosophy of 
History, is based on the principle that “the State is the actually existing real­
ized moral life” because “the State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth.” 
This “glorification of the State” as Bertrand Russell terms it, has serious 
implications for the individual, because in Hegel’s system the “rational State” 
is regarded as the historical embodiment of his Universal, an “objectified 
Spirit,” that he also labels a “Divine Idea,” resulting in a religious affirma­
tion of political and social policy reminiscent of Peter Berger’s sacred canopy. 
Politically and religiously, this sets out the path to ethical righteousness for 
each individual in a rather fixed manner; the key issue for Kierkegaard is that 
the State in Hegel’s system becomes the authority for knowable morality, for 
the individual “only has objectivity, truth, and morality in so far as he is a 
member of the State.”4
3 This approach is perhaps most clearly expressed in distinction of philosophy as analysis 
of the empirical and religion as an inquiry into the subjective and personal as discussed in his 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, published in 1846. His value of subjective certainty is 
more meaningful than analyzed, speculated objective truth, even while admitting that subjec­
tively found truth always includes some degree of uncertainty, which marks his stance as 
“unscientific.” But Kierkegaard is not denying the value of objective truth, even that of the 
self as an empirical object, when he states that “Truth is Subjectivity” as a chapter title in the 
Postscript, rather he is stressing the inescapable need of each individual to understand what­
ever objective (or any other) truth is on his own terms, in terms of who he is himself, yet, admit­
tedly, by means of a reference point outside the self.
4 Russell 1945, pp. 739-40. Hegel compared the relationship between the individual and 
the State as that of the eye and the body, such that the eye can be examined and valued outside 
the body but it only has functionality, the true source of its existential meaning, as part of the 
greater whole of the body.
In contrast to Hegel’s nationalist sentiments toward his native Prussia, 
Kierkegaard composes ten essays in the last year of his life for the specific 
purpose of critiquing normative ways of thinking in his native Denmark. 
Expressly critical of Christian attitudes, they originally appear in the serial 
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The Moment,5 but he later collects them together in one volume which he pub­
lishes under the title Attack upon Christendom. Clinging in this context to the 
subjective individuality of Socrates, he not only questions the value of the sci­
entific apparatus but, standing on the doctrine in Matthew 7:14 that the tine 
way is narrow and difficult and “there are few who find it,” Kierkegaard 
rejects the possibility that the social setting of any historically-established 
Christian society could safely be Christian. He titles one chapter, for exam­
ple, “Is it Defensible for the State—the Christian State!—to Make, If Possible, 
Christianity Impossible?” In another he writes :
5 Dieblikket, also translated as The Instant. There were ten issues in all, each containing a 
group of articles by Kierkegaard, and all written in his last 6 months.
6 Kierkegaard 1998, p. 115. Kierkegaard also stresses that real “transitions” should be 
viewed as possibilities rather than inevitabilities. For Kierkegaard, as for Heidegger and Sartre 
after him, things that may occur only when contingent factors of “non-necessity” are opera­
tive. In the traditional scientific world-view, the viewer strives to reduce his visibility in the 
service of approaching the goal of objectivity, the logical conclusion of which yields an obser­
vation from no point of view, as the self ideally disappears. It is no accident that capitalism 
and the scientific revolution are essentially bom at the same time, as they both embody the pre­
sumption that humans are originally autonomous organisms capable of reshaping themselves 
and their surroundings at will and therefore capable of adapting as the need arises en masse, 
i.e., impersonally. In rejecting these hallmarks of the modern age, Kierkegaard’s focus on the 
value of individual anomalous experience presages the move from Newtonian physics through 
Einstein to quantum physics. Key here is his belief that the individual must stand in opposi­
tion to God to realize the reality of God and himself, and thus precluding any socially norma­
tive forms of Christianity that preach uniform concepts of faith.
Now, however, to stay only with Denmark, we are all Christians; 
the way is as broad as possible, the broadest in Denmark, since it 
is the one we are all walking on, easy and comfortable in every way, 
and the gate is as wide as possible—indeed, no gate can be wider 
than one through which we all walk en masse', ergo the New 
Testament is no longer truth.6
Kierkegaard does not doubt the fact that man sees himself as autonomous and 
that a normative, socialized Christianity defines religion for most people. But 
he sees this modem condition as leading not to historical development or 
progress in a Hegelian sense, but to a woeful state in which the individual 
unconsciously abnegates accountability for himself and his actions in his rush 
to find himself through the various collectivities with which he identifies, only 
one of which is his church. This produces an alienation from one’s actual self, 
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a lack of sensitivity as to the nature of this problem, and bewilderment as to 
how and why to solve it.
This is the central theme of his later writings and the basic content of the 
“despair” that is the focus of The Sickness unto Death where, in Part Two, he 
declares that this “despair is sin.” But though fundamental and universal, 
Kierkegaard never equates this notion of sin with the Christian doctrine of 
Original Sin because he insists there is always choice involved. His sense of 
sin does not result from any one act, nor does he accept the conclusion of 
Socrates that sin is ignorance.7 Rather, sin for Kierkegaard in this work seems 
more of an “existential attitude,” to quote Louis Dupre.8 In this, I think 
Kierkegaard’s notion of sin is very close to Shinran’s use of the words tsumi 
P (sin) or akunin BA (evil person), and hence directly relevant to Kiyozawa. 
The ambiguity that follows upon a notion of sin that is neither inherited nor 
produced by behavior only amplifies the ambivalence that pervades all 
notions of ethics in the modem age when norms of behavior change so quick­
ly. Here again, Kierkegaard and Kiyozawa tread similar ground.
7 Kierkegaard 1980, p. 87ff.
8 Dupre 1987, p. 85.
9 Kierkegaard 1989, p. 24.
Kierkegaard’s stance has immediate ethical implications because in assert­
ing the centrality of a personal accommodation of religious truth, he not only 
rejects the kind of pietistic acceptance of religious and moral norms that so 
characterized his father’s faith, but he also affirms an “existential” account­
ability for the individual in all fundamental choices that he/she makes. A core 
theme in his project, therefore, is the assertion that despite the given distance 
between Man and God, for each individual the self is culpable for its own 
despair, and the need to do something about it, should strike him as a moral 
imperative. As Alastair Hannay explains:
Kierkegaard’s notion of self-consciousness is clearly moral. That 
is, it is neither merely introspective nor merely practical in the sense 
of strategic. What Kierkegaard’s self is conscious of is itself as 
being in a state of despair, but also of itself as despairing [sic], as 
being responsible for failing to keep to its ideal of fulfillment, or 
failing to keep that ideal in view.9
There are many who have rejected the presumption of moral or ethical author­
ity in the State under which they live or in the Church in which they are raised, 
but Kierkegaard and Kiyozawa are unusual in that they not only deny the 
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ultimate authority of Church or State, but in that they also do not see this 
lack of authority as leading to any sense of victimization in the individual 
and its accompanying rationalized avoidance of ethical responsibility. Rather 
they both offer discerning arguments as to why the awareness of this 
problem should be seen positively as providing the impetus to religious awak­
ening.
The problem of subjectivity and ethics led Kierkegaard to a theory of three 
phases of understanding within an individual existence—aesthetic, ethical, 
and religious—all of which demand a personal choice that jettisons one path 
in order to embrace another. Beginning with the choice of aesthetic or ethi­
cal in Either/Or, the full schematic is most fully developed in Stages on Life’s 
Way (1845) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), his last two 
pseudonymous works. Although there is a kind of a natural movement from 
one concern to another, Kierkegaard uses the terms “spheres” or “existence 
spheres” far more often than “stages.” In this, he was probably trying to avoid 
the presumption that the three necessarily imply an inevitable progression. 
Taken together, they nevertheless form a natural three-stage pilgrim’s prog­
ress toward personal liberation that is the fruit of realizing religious truth. In 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the religious stage is further split into 
Religiousness A and Religiousness B, wherein the former must be tran­
scended to reach the final goal, which has led to interpretations yielding four- 
or even five-stage schema.10 Below is an outline of these four stages and the 
inferred principles the realization of which motivates the individual to move 
from one stage to the next.
10 In addition to the commonly accepted three stages of aesthetic, ethical, and religious, A. 
Rudd adds a first, preliminary stage he calls the “crowd life,” and divides the religious stage 
into two: Religiousness A (non-Christianity) and Religiousness B (Christianity). See Rudd 
1993, pp. 24-26. On Kierkegaard’s terminology for these, see Kierkegaard, 1988, pp. x-xi. 
An important part of Kierkegaard’s discussion involves the relationship between these spheres 
or stages in the life of the individual and how one makes the leap from one to another, but there 
is only room for a cursory look at this issue here.
Kierkegaard’s Three Stages to Religious Truth
(1) Aesthetic Existence
As an individual moves from adolescence into young adulthood, one typi­
cally becomes devoted to the pursuit of pleasure. Whereas in adolescence one 
accepts the binds of social convention in pursuit of a sense of identity in con­
formity, which in Kierkegaard’s time must have meant self-discipline and 
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restraint, the lives of most young adults are dominated by a different value 
system wherein the conformity need yields to the allure of beauty and the urge 
to pursue hedonistic goals. Representative of this outlook is the attitude found 
today in college students and young adults, whose lives are typically domi­
nated by the pursuit of personal enjoyment and who generally regard the eth­
ical norms of church and “adult” society as arbitrary and dehumanizing. 
Meeting one’s responsibilities is often rationalized as merely putting on a 
required face for one’s superiors rather than any expression of personal agree­
ment with the principles underlying that need. Simply stated, the purpose for 
living this kind of existence is to enjoy oneself, and the individual’s sense of 
self is rarely seen in moral or religious terms. For such a person, notions of 
morality, ethics, or religion figure in their lives largely in a materialistic way, 
as such he/she is usually incapable of committing to any set of beliefs origi­
nating outside his own experience. Such a person is ruled by mood, whim, 
imagination, or chance, and their greatest fear is boredom.11 Their psycho­
logical profile is characterized by doubt or skepticism in a profound, exis­
tential way, and their sense of self presumes a given isolation from society.12
11 See Kierkegaard’s discussion on how to avoid boredom in the essay, “The Rotation of 
Crops,” contained in Kierkegaard 1987, vol. I, pp. 281-300.
12 The following outline of the three stages of existence is largely based on the summary 
provided by Rudd, especially Chapters 3 and 4.
(2) Ethical Existence
In the second volume of Either/Or, strong criticism is presented against some­
one devoted to the aesthetic, amoral existence described above, and a case is 
made for the value of committing oneself to an ethically proper life. The argu­
ment against the aesthetic existence stems from the fact that living amorally 
prevents the individual from making long-term commitments, and a life 
without commitments leads to lack of purpose and psychological despair. In 
response, the path to true self-fulfillment is now sought in intentionally inte­
grating into adult society by committing oneself to a series of confining rela­
tionships in marriage and work. Not only does one accept the validity of 
traditional norms of society but he/she gains a stake in history by devoting 
himself/herself to the enhancement and continuation of these norms for future 
generations. In contrast to the person living an aesthetic existence who resists 
or rejects norms of morality and ethics, in an ethical existence the individual 
embraces the responsibility of deciding what constitutes good and evil behav­
ior, and thus people typically do not enter this phase until they have some 
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decision-making experience as adults to draw from. Kierkegaard stresses the 
important role played here by intentionality and choice, or what he calls 
“choosing to will,” which I understand to signify the choice to avoid or par­
ticipate in what may be a complex or morally ambiguous situation and to 
assert one’s will in how one lives with that choice and, if participating, ratio­
nalizes their subsequent judgments within the limits of their involvement. 
Clearly, the key element here is commitment to a certain way of life and 
accepting that the standards forjudging that way of life are determined by a 
negotiation between social and personal realities. The purely subjective world 
of the aesthete is thus surrendered to the intersubjective realm of society.
While Kierkegaard notes that not everyone transitions from the aesthetic 
to the ethical, the normative nature of this move is implied when his author­
itative fictional character, Judge William, stresses that personal satisfaction 
cannot be but in social terms, as ultimately we are a product of our society.13 
This transition begins when the importance of spontaneity in the aesthetic 
existence becomes overshadowed by a sense of hollowness before the ethi­
cal life and its offering of continuity and stability. Over time, an existence 
dominated by aesthetics leads not only to despair but even madness and sui­
cide, and that freedom is easily sacrificed for a return to a participatory social 
identity with its promise to an individual, of a sense of personal balance that 
comes from membership in a community. But while the move to an ethical 
existence goes a long way to solving the anxiety associated with isolation, it 
also ushers in a new series of problems related to “practice.” That is, while 
at this stage Kierkegaard does distinguish personal virtues from civic virtues, 
nevertheless as one’s responsibility m the community grows, the individual 
is forced to grapple with determining precisely what is ethical and what is not, 
as well as how the most ethical choice should be properly implemented.
13 Rudd 1993, p. 77.
(3) Religious Existence
While an ethical existence initially suppresses the fundamental despair inher­
ent in the human condition by providing a path to social integration via accep­
tance and validation by one’s peers, it ultimately fails to satisfy us completely 
because it is based on dubious religious grounds that, when exposed, make it 
look capricious, unjust, and only of relative value. Because it naively assumes 
that we relate to religious truth—to God—primarily in an ethical way, “main­
ly by the simple performance of our social duties,” the latent religious con­
sciousness within the ethical individual will arise at some point and suggest 
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to him that something significant is lacking because he is “not religious in 
any decisive sense.”14 On the one hand, as fundamentally a religious person, 
Kierkegaard simply could not abide the ultimate authority of any atheistic 
scheme of morality, as any such notion ultimately devolves into a Hegelian 
justification of the status quo. On the other hand, Kierkegaard viewed each 
individual as ultimately responsible for making sense of his own existence in 
a way that required him to confront and seek confirmation of his religious 
beliefs in a completely personal way. Ethics when it is merely ethics is there­
fore too limited, too unsubstantiated, too dependent upon society’s need to 
maintain its own norms. If not through religion, then how does an individual 
find values, even ethical ones, that are not contingent, not conditional? Kant 
and especially Hegel presume a teleology of ethics based on the presumption 
of principles that are universal, rational and thereby discernible, and whose 
relationship with religion is more accidental than derivative. Kierkegaard’s 
Judge William represents just such a view when he proclaims his satisfaction 
with who he is and what he is in his position atop society, where he can see 
how the value of religion lies in its authoritative support for the normative 
ethical and moral values of that society.
14 Ibid., p. 116.
15 On the traditional Jewish interpretations of the akedah, see Jacobs 1981, pp. 1-9.
But Kierkegaard’s own view is that the religion of Judge William is not 
religion at all, but a convenient social construct. True religion does not affirm 
what we know of ourselves and our world, it disturbs it. His textual proof for 
this is what the Jewish tradition calls the akedah, the story in Genesis where 
Abraham is called by God to sacrifice his son Isaac as a burnt offering. Dis­
cussed in detail in Fear and Trembling (1843), Kierkegaard concludes by 
taking a rather conservative interpretive stance, one of three found in tradi­
tional Jewish exegesis,15 that regards Abraham’s unquestioning acceptance 
of God’s decree a towering achievement. For Kierkegaard, this marks 
Abraham as a “knight of faith” for all to emulate. In this story of the unas­
sailable authority of the Biblical God directing a father to murder his son, 
Kierkegaard finds a revelation of what we might call the deep or esoteric struc­
ture of the ethico-religious conundrum, soaring like a rocket into the edifice 
of societal norms of morality and ethics otherwise justified by religion. He 
explains the significance of the story in this way:
The story of Abraham contains, then, a teleological suspension of 
the ethical. As the single individual he became higher than the uni-
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versal. This is the paradox, which cannot be mediated.16
16 Kierkegaard 1983, p. 66.
The “universal” here refers to Kant’s notion of universal principles that define 
morality as such (Moralitaf), inherited and expanded in Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. 
From this universal point of view, Abraham is a tragic figure, albeit a tragic 
hero because he has been chosen by God for this communication, who ends 
up in a situation where he cannot avoid committing infanticide. But in seeing 
Abraham instead as a “knight of faith,” Kierkegaard is rejecting the tragic 
hero model and all it represents precisely because he wants to argue that a 
religious existence is one that must leave behind the ethical as an absolute 
telos. That this shifts the focus from the universal to the personal is what he 
identifies above as the paradox, but from the perspective of one living a reli­
gious existence, that paradox becomes moot the moment he leaps into the reli­
gious sphere. And it would appear that a leap is required here, for any 
discussion of the akedah story must recognize that Abraham was about to 
become a murderer, especially in that infanticide is condemned in numerous 
other places in the Hebrew Bible.
(4) Religiousness A and Religiousness B
Finally, we have the important split within religious existence between 
Religiousness A and Religiousness B, presented in Sickness Unto Death and 
further detailed in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Religiousness A rep­
resents the first stage of religious existence whereby subjectivity is no longer 
dependent upon an ethical telos-, that is, the “finite is abandoned.” 
Kierkegaard views this initial religious identity as a kind of “natural religion,” 
a term that like the other nomenclature in his scheme, is initially used posi­
tively but later gives way to an outlook undeniably pejorative. For many this 
will take the form of Christianity. Natural religion, as defined by Kierkegaard, 
is characterized by immanence of the sacred and in this “existence” the indi­
vidual seeks both “eternal happiness” and spiritual balance via a ritualized 
integration with an objectified sacred realm whereby the goal is realization 
of the self as part of that sacred realm. That this definition is appropriate for 
“primitive,” typically animistic religions outside of Europe is explicit in 
Kierkegaard, but he also means it to apply to establishment Christianity as it 
was practiced in Europe (or at least Lutheran Europe) in his time. Although 
less ideal than Religiousness B, reaching Religiousness A is nevertheless a 
significant step, for abandoning the finite involves abandoning a definition of 
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self that up to that point had been deeply invested in that finite world, and this 
is painful, particularly when combined with the guilt that comes with the real­
ization that the infinite cannot be totally embraced.
Religiousness B designates awareness of the true state of things. Here the 
sacred is defined not as Nature but as the creator God, and is totally other. 
This B stage is inconceivable except from the vantage point of A, for only the 
individual settled in Religiousness A realizes the implications of the fact that 
he inevitably stands imperfect before the sacred and that, despite his ideal­
ism, integration with it is impossible. It is at that moment that he opens up to 
Religiousness B. If Religiousness A brings on feelings of joy and affirmation, 
Religiousness B brings on “fear and trembling” and repentance before the 
absolute authority of God, for here it is abundantly clear that no amount of 
any “will to practice” can change the fact that one is weak and unable to com­
pletely love God in the way that God requests. Religiousness A, then, is reli­
gion that confirms identity, but Religiousness B is religion that disturbs it. It 
brings not peace but deep agitation, anxiety. This is life’s despair, the “sick­
ness unto death,” but the realization that launches one into an existence at 
Religiousness B also illuminates a path to the resolution of that despair 
because of the new-found proximity to God. Religiousness B is what 
Kierkegaard calls “primitive Christianity” standing in opposition to Christen­
dom, his term for the social phenomenon that uses Christ to promote a set of 
values that affirms social norms of morality, i.e., the Lutheran pietism of his 
native Denmark and most of northern Europe.
Subjectivity
A final point about subjectivity is in order, because this theme is so prevalent 
in both Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard often says “truth is subjec­
tivity,” which is his way of stating that the path to God is through subjectiv­
ity. Yet, this subjectivity always functions in a relationship of tension, not only 
with the world but also with the self itself. Levinas describes this as 
Kierkegaard’s conviction that “human subjectivity, together with its di­
mension of interiority, needs to be maintained as an absolute,” and notes 
Kierkegaard’s fierce opposition to Hegel’s efforts at reducing (elevating for 
Hegel) the subjective to an idealism in the form of transcendent Reason.17 
Yet, the experience of frustration in Religiousness A is, in some sense, a state­
ment that this subjectivity itself is still not enough. Thus we have yet anoth­
17 Emmanuel Levinas in Ree and Chamberlain 1998, pp. 26-27.
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er paradox, for this realization
. . . does not represent a return to objective philosophizing. On the 
contrary, it insists that, formally or ideally speaking, subjectivity is 
the truth—I only arrive at the relationship to God via a passionate 
concern to find meaning in my life, not via objective speculation. 
But, as a fallen creature, a sinner, wholly alienated from God, I am 
unable to relate to Him even through the most passionate subjec­
tivity, for there is, from the start, a conniption, an “untruth” within 
me.18
18 Rudd 1993, p. 159.
19 Kierkegaard 1992a, p. 556.
20 Ibid., p. 647.
For Kierkegaard, then, alongside the pervasive theme of despair or suffering, 
subjectivity is always at the heart of the argument. The religious existence 
could even be said to be characterized by a return to the subjectivity that also 
lies at the center of the aesthetic existence, but from the aesthetic viewpoint, 
the biblical message of Religiousness B is incomprehensible. At the level of 
Religiousness A, subjectivity means that I am aware of the presence of God 
and actively seek to deepen my relationship with him as the source of mean­
ing in my life. This is described by Kierkegaard as a “dialectical inward 
deepening,”19 that serves to establish a relationship between the self and the 
sacred. Religiousness B, on the other hand, begins where this dialectical 
movement is pushed aside entirely. That is, as subjectivity deepens, my pathos 
deepens, but the awareness of an internal “untruth” within my nature also 
deepens, ultimately revealing this to be the fundamental cause of my suffer­
ing. Kierkegaard thus describes a progression of “pathos awareness” that 
moves from resignation to suffering to guilt, the guilt coming from the real­
ization that before God I am not true in my faith, however much I may will 
it to the contrary. It is here that the true relationship emerges wherein I see 
my absolute dependence upon God, in essence deconstructing the religion I 
managed to awaken to and took comfort in at the stage of Religiousness A. 
Religiousness B is therefore a religion of revelation rather than striving. It is 
so irrational that it cannot be known by any other means, to wit, 
“Religiousness A must be present to the individual before there can be any 
consideration of becoming aware of the dialectic of B.”20 It is not surprising, 
therefore, to read that by his own admission, Kierkegaard’s “intention is to 
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make it difficult to become a Christian.”21
21 Ibid.,p. 557.
Kiyozawa Manshi and Ethics in the Meiji Period
In 1863, eight years after Kierkegaard’s death, Kiyozawa Manshi was bom 
on the other side of the world into a low-ranking samurai family in Nagoya, 
Japan. Like Kierkegaard, his family was relatively devout but as a Japanese 
Buddhist, that meant more than one stream of learning. That is, from his father 
he learned Zen discipline, Zen literature, and Confucian philosophy, while 
his mother instilled in him the values of a pious follower of Jodo Shinshu (?> 
±M^, also referred to as Shinshu). When the Meiji Restoration in 1868 
brought the end of privileges for the samurai class, his family was reduced to 
poverty. Left to the whims of a society in upheaval, Manshi experienced a 
decidedly unstable educational experience. The secular focus of this early 
schooling, combining the texts and values of late Edo period Neo­
Confucianism with Meiji moral education and nationalism, was cut short at 
the age of fifteen when he was sent to a Buddhist secondary school in Kyoto 
run by the Otani branch of Jodo Shinshu. Attracted by the promise of temple 
scholarships for bright students, he was also ordained at that time. Academic 
achievement and Honganji support led to his admission and matriculation at 
Tokyo Imperial University, where he joined the first generation of Japanese 
to study Western Philosophy under Ernest Fenollosa. While a few European 
philosophers in Kierkegaard’s time did take a hard look at Buddhism, most 
notably Schopenhauer, there is no evidence of any Buddhist ideas in 
Kierkegaard’s writings and it is unlikely he would have been attracted to the 
atheism of Schopenhauer. Kiyozawa, on the other hand, needed to become 
familiar with the basics of Christian theology to succeed in his philosophy 
studies, and while living in Tokyo in the 1880s he undoubtedly encountered 
the first wave of generally intolerant Christian missionaries whose ideas 
poured into Japan along with other new concepts in science, technology, 
social and political culture. Ethics was of great concern to the leaders of 
Japanese society both in bakumatsu and Meiji political culture and, aside from 
references to the emperor cult, the values promoted in the Imperial Rescript 
on Education were not appreciably different from what was taught in the tera- 
koya, or local temple schools, before the Restoration. What changed in the 
Meiji period was that ethical and moral education was now grounded in a new 
kind of nationalism as expressed in terms like kokutai and kokka. In addition 
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to the promotion of literacy and the creation of a national language, one of 
the prime goals of the powerful Ministry of Education, newly formed in 1871, 
was the creation of normative cultural values that strongly encouraged iden­
tification with the nation-state among people at all levels of society.
Much like Kierkegaard’s Denmark, in Kiyozawa’s Japan ethical rhetoric 
was tethered to, nay, anchored by a religious discourse that flowed from soci­
ety’s leaders, including university professors, though many intellectuals saw 
this to be of dubious legitimacy. But a major difference between their situa­
tions is that whereas ethics in Denmark was largely defined by the Danish 
State Church whose pietistic Lutheranism also dominated the Kierkegaard 
family, the religious basis of ethics promoted by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education in Kiyozawa’s time was defined as Shinto, while the Kiyozawa 
family subscribed to Buddhist views, albeit with some diversity. Thus while 
both grew up in devout households, during Kiyozawa’s youth his government 
expressed open antipathy toward his family’s religion, and as a child he expe­
rienced the infamous haibutsu kishaku persecution between 1868 and 1873 
that sought to weaken Buddhism’s influence in Japan in order to promote 
State Shinto. This meant such things as the legal appropriation of temple land 
and art objects, the purging of Buddhist elements from Shinto shrines and rit­
uals, and various public steps taken to discredit the Sangha.
But despite the initial enmity between his church and the State, as a young 
adult Kiyozawa came to take a critical stance toward his home institution, a 
stance decidedly similar to that of Kierkegaard. Entrenched socially and doc­
trinally, with deeply held political and financial interests in the status quo 
since the sixteenth century, by the mid- 1880s when Kiyozawa began to write 
for publication as a graduate student, this long-standing conservatism led both 
Nishi and Higashi Honganji to find their way back into the graces of the new 
ruling class. Unlike Kierkegaard, Kiyozawa had no inheritance and, feeling 
relatively comfortable in a university setting, he fully intended to make a 
career for himself teaching philosophy. In 1887, while still an undergraduate 
at Tokyo Imperial University, he served as co-editor for the first five issues 
of the new journal Tetsugakkai zasshi (Journal of the Philosophy
Association), put out by the academic group Tetsugakkai launched by his 
elder classmate Inoue Enryo, and was accepted into graduate school major­
ing in philosophy of religion. But in 1888, at the age of twenty-five, he was 
asked by Higashi Honganji to return to Kyoto to become principal of a mid­
dle school and lecturer at the Takakura Gakuryo, which functioned as a sem­
inary for Higashi Honganji. That meant leaving school before finishing and
73
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST XXXV, 1 & 2 
though he only remained in that position for two years, he never returned to 
graduate school. Upon returning to Kyoto as a young scholar and working in 
the midst of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the honzan, he soon became crit­
ical of an overzealousness on the part of many Buddhist clergy ready to com­
promise with the prevailing nationalist rhetoric in hopes of regaining their 
status in society, as well as with the many intellectuals who advocated that 
Japan jettison its Buddhist values in a fawning reverence for Western notions 
of “rational morality.”
Kiyozawa’s first published writings on ethics, for example, were apologia 
for Buddhist theories of karma directed at the Meiji elite Kato Hiroyuki 
(1836-1916), who ridiculed the Buddhist idea that retribution for good and 
bad acts could come “naturally.”22 As a founding member of the Meirokusha, 
president of Tokyo Imperial University, member of the Diet and advisor to 
the Emperor, Kato found a broad audience in his promotion of utilitarianism, 
Spencer’s mechanistic positivism, and social Darwinism as the right philoso­
phies for turning Japanese society into a modem nation as powerful as Great 
Britain. The debate between them reminds us although Buddhist thinkers have 
not been traditionally sensitive to specific problems of ethics or morality, that 
has not always been the case. And given the political circumstances within 
which Kiyozawa lived, when centuries of tacit government support for 
Buddhism’s influence on society was being overturned in service of a new 
ethic of material competition and rising xenophobia, one wonders if 
Kiyozawa’s felt need to speak out on religion and ethics may have merely 
been a convenient vehicle for him to reassert the importance of traditional 
Buddhist values in a new and more relevant context. He was not the only per­
son to publish tracts opposing Kato’s positions,23 but at a time when a rea­
soned argument based on the contribution of Buddhism to social cohesion and 
responsibility would have served him well, his career-imperiling conclusion
22 Kato’s views are found in a number of articles in Tetsugaku zasshi such as
“Ningen to shizen shinkaron AIb) b (Humans and Natural Evolution),” 3:36,
“Bukkyo ni iwayuru zen’aku no inga oho ha shinri ni arazu p/rBSSBy
—7 7 7. (Buddhist so-called Retribution for Good and Evil is Not the Truth),” 10:100 (1895). 
Kiyozawa published his counter-arguments in the same journal in two pieces: “Kato sensei ni 
tadasu (Asking Professor Kato),” 10:102 and “Zen’aku no inga oho ron ni
tsuite futatabi Kato sensei ni tadasu (Asking
Professor Kato Again Regarding the Buddhist Theory of Retribution for Good and Evil),” 
10:106. The last two can be found in Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshii, vol. 2 (Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 
pp. 293-306.
23 Ikeda 1980, pp. 259-262, also cites Inoue Enryd, Onishi Hajime, and Kashiwagi Gien.
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that the real significance of ethics lay in how its ambiguity serves as a vehi­
cle for religious insight is quite remarkable, and remarkably close to that of 
Kierkegaard. Let us now consider how Kiyozawa came to that conclusion.
Kiyozawa’s Writings on Ethics and Religion
Kiyozawa’s writings on ethics can be roughly broken down into two periods: 
a cluster that appears in the years 1891-92 (Meiji 24-25), written at the end 
of his twenties, and another group of writings that begins in 1899 and con­
tinues until his death in 1903 at the age of forty-one. The early writings, some 
of which only appeared posthumously, are collected in volume three of both 
the Hozokan and Iwanami Shoten editions of his collected works.24 These 
essays reflect Kiyozawa’s interest in prevailing trends in European philoso­
phy as understood in Japan, and although his religious concerns are evident, 
they rarely address specifically Buddhist problems. The latter collection of 
essays displays a passion lacking in the former and he has dropped any hes­
itation previously held about arguing from the perspective of Buddhism and 
Jodo Shinshu in particular. The first set of essays therefore appears to be writ­
ten for a more general audience, whereas the second group reflects his stature 
as leader of his Seishin-shugi S movement and reads like well-argued 
testimonials directed to his disciples. All these works are relevant to ascer­
taining Kiyozawa’s thoughts on the meaning and role of ethics for the indi­
vidual and society, but two stand out as particularly mature statements on the 
relationship between ethics and religion: “Shukyo to dotoku to no sokan 
ElMSEOffllM (Interrelationship of Religion and Morality; hereafter abbrevi­
ated as Interrelationship),'" published in the journal Mujinto 
(Inexhaustible Lamp) in 1899, and “Shukyoteki dotoku (zokutai) to futsu 
dotoku to no kbsho (Negotiating
24 Akegarasu Haya and Nishimura Kengyo, eds., Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshit (Hozokan, 
1953); Otani Daigaku, ed., ATyozawa Manshi Zenshit (Iwanami Shoten, 2002-03). In the for­
mer edition, Kiyozawa’s writings on ethics are in volumes 3 and 6, with this early group gath­
ered under the title “Rinri kenkyu frafUjffTE.” The latter edition divides the essays differently, 
but they are also found in volumes 3 and 6, with most of the early pieces under a similar rubric, 
“Rinrigaku irajJI'T’.” References in this essay will be to the latter edition, abbreviated as 
KMZ.
25 “Shukyo to dotoku to no sokan,” in KMZ, vol. 6, pp. 223-34; “Shtikyoteki dotoku (zoku­
tai) to futsu dotoku to no kosho,” in KMZ, vol. 6, pp. 148-58.
Religious Morality and Ordinary Morality; hereafter abbreviated as 
Negotiating)" published in the Seishinkai in 1903.25 Negotiating was writ­
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ten after the recurrence of tuberculosis, the illness that eventually took his life, 
and ends with the colophon: “Written after illness has struck, I extend my 
apologies for passages where a certain roughness was unavoidable.” It is quite 
likely that he wrote this tract in a state of mind accepting his imminent death. 
As such, it serves as his final statement on this topic, and stands alongside the 
famous “Waga shinnen”—also written in the same period—in defining his 
religious perspective. Whether or not the inferred premise that Kiyozawa 
chose to write about the problem of ethics and religion during his final days 
because of its importance to him is true, it cannot be denied that this essay 
has been largely overshadowed by the attention given “Waga shinnen.” 
Negotiating also includes discussion of the Shinshu interpretation of the two- 
truth theory of Mahayana Buddhism, a controversial issue at the time because 
it was often used by Meiji Buddhists to rationalize the government’s imperi­
alistic policies.26
26 See Shigaraki 1988, pp. 7-88. See also Kawamoto 1988, pp. 147-173.
Before considering Kierkegaard’s three- or four-stage schema in terms of 
Kiyozawa’s thought, let us first look at how Kiyozawa typically framed the 
problem of ethics and religion. In general, three basic questions may be 
gleaned from his writings:
(1) Subjectively viewed, where can we locate the authority for our ethi­
cal judgments?
(2) What is the proper relationship between religion and ethics?
(3) What standpoint should Jodo Shinshu take on the issue of ethics?
(1) Ethical Authority
The question of ethical authority is something that Kiyozawa studied in Kant 
and Hegel, but his view of this issue is more focused on practical matters 
rather than the kind of idealism seen in those two thinkers. Echoing 
Kierkegaard, in Negotiating Kiyozawa asks what happens when an individ­
ual who has relied upon a heretofore wonderfully built ethical system in his 
heart, unexpectedly finds it does not apply well to a problem before him. That 
person’s ethics may be based on universal principles (Kant), perfectly ratio­
nal (Hegel), and have served him/her well for years until this moment, but 
Kiyozawa’s point is that any ethical system—regardless of its basis—can 
prove disfunctional when confronted with a serious dilemma. Living in a time 
of great social change, Kiyozawa notes that established notions of good and 
evil (zen ’aku #3R) in one country may not be acceptable in another, and even 
within the same country the content of what is deemed good or acceptable 
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frequently changes over time. His conclusion is that creating a truly univer­
sal system of ethics that would function well in all cultures at all moments in 
history is impossible.
In fact, Kiyozawa expressed much the same sentiment a decade earlier in 
the essay “Gentoku (Ethical Principles)” written in 1891, the contents of 
which are summarized in a section of his better-known Shiikyo tetsugaku 
gaikotsu TnSSY'fLH’ of 1892, translated as Skeleton?1 In the former piece, 
he begins by considering the problem of rydshin&ub or “conscience” for 
Japan. The word rydshin (Ch. liangxiri) was used by Mencius to designate an 
inherent ability to judge right from wrong, and became an important concept 
in the Neo-Confucian thought of Zhuxi (1130-1200) and Wang 
Yangming 3TB0J3 (1472-1528); it was also settled upon in the Meiji period to 
translate the Western concept of “conscience.” If Kiyozawa was aware of the 
Western overlay on rydshin, he does not mention it; he makes no reference 
to Luther’s religious use of the term conscience as the mechanism by which 
man knows his sinful nature. Instead he presupposes rydshin to be a kind of 
natural moral compass that requires honing or tuning to one’s contemporary 
surroundings, analyzing the five Confucian relationships in terms of where 
people in contemporary Japan go to seek authoritative systems of thought for 
their ethical judgments. He offers four prevailing “principles” (changed to 
“standards” in Skeleton)'. utilitarianism (kori shugi 5Wll±IS), intuitionism 
(chokkaku kyo jSWiS), rigorism (genshuku shugi MSTiiS), and rationalism 
(dori kyo llg^). His methodology was to analyze each theory in terms of 
their pragmatic effect upon “conscience” in terms of three ethically relevant 
“principles” and across three aspects of each. The three ethical principles are 
(1) how [they affect] the relative pain or joy of the conscience, (2) how they 
clarify the operational understanding of good and evil, i.e., what is their prag­
matic value, and (3) can they lead to the sublime goal of the highest infini­
tude. The three aspects are the beginning standpoint, progress toward the goal, 
and whether or not they reach their intended goal. Of course, the “people” 
seeking authority for their ethical values here, are not fishermen or rice farm­
ers, as this essay is really intended as a critique of all four “-isms” or princi­
ples named above, commonly debated among students of Western philosophy 
in Japan at that time.
27 “Gentoku” (in KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 347-51) is in Hozokan edition vol. 3,pp. 307-11 under the 
title “Rinri no gensoku, Shiikyo tetsugaku gaikotsu (Skeleton of a Philosophy of
Religion) is in KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 3-107. The English translation of Skeleton (KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 
109-50) is by Noguchi Zenshiro with significant revisions by Kiyozawa himself.
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Although he does not name sources, his description of utilitarianism iden­
tifies good with pleasure, evil with pain, and thus can be traced directly to 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and perhaps John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). 
Kiyozawa finds the utilitarian viewpoint plausible as a starting point, but it 
offers no system for helping the individual progress to reach spiritual goals. 
Standing in opposition to utilitarianism is intuitionism, where good is not 
deduced from analyzing experience but sensed internally, and here Kiyozawa 
is probably reflecting the ideas of Zhuxi, Wang Yangming, Shaftesbury 
(1671-1713) and possibly G.E. Moore (18 7 3-19 5 8).28 Kiyozawa argues the 
principle that one’s intuition can clarify good and evil for us but is incapable 
of being the vehicle of progress, and hence will fail to be the means to under­
standing higher truth. Rigorism rejects the hedonism of the utilitarians, instead 
opting for strict adherence to established morals, and is not only identified 
with the Stoics but also linked to Kant because in this perspective established 
morals and ethics are justified by their very operational presence. This cate­
gory is changed in Skeleton to the biblical sounding “divine-will theory” (fl 
which he defines as moral rules based on scripture, 
but this suggests that he intended rigorism to represent traditional Buddhist, 
Shinto, and Confucian norms of morality. Naturally disposed to self-disci­
pline himself, Kiyozawa esteems the discipline and practical applicability of 
rigorism, but doubts it can bring one to realize anjin (ST'), or personal lib­
eration. In his response to rigorism, we may infer something of the inevitable 
conflict between the faith of his mother and that of his father, with his moth­
er’s tariki (ItilS other-power) side prevailing; in fact his response to all four 
ethical positions reflects a deep commitment to the Pure Land perspective. 
Although the term dori (US) in the Meiji period has many meanings and 
some even used the word dorikyd to represent Buddhism,29 his gloss in 
Skeleton points to the primacy of rational principles, and thus probably rep­
resents thinkers like Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716), Kant and 
Hegel. In this category, moral truth is discernible through reason. Kiyozawa 
rejects rationalism as well, because it only illuminated the process, the pro­
gression, but not the goal.
28 However Moore’s major treatise on intuitionism, Principia Ethica, was not published until 
1903.
29 Shaku Soen uses dorikyo as a gloss for Buddhism as a “teaching based on principles” to 
contrast it with tenkeikyd (IXsW), or religious “teachings based on revelation from a god.” 
See Chapter 3 of Shaku 1909, pp. 6-9.
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Unlike his later essays that attempt to look at how the ethical and religious 
dimensions impact each other, in “Gentoku” the two have somewhat disparate 
concerns:
It is essential that the goal of an explanation of true ethical princi­
ples (MiEOil#) clarifies the three matters of objective (@W), 
process (firg), and foundation (rzW). The objective should yield 
anjin, the process should indicate the reasons, and the foundation 
must determine the actual situation. Yet among these three, only the 
foundation [aspect] may be elucidated solely in terms of ethics; the 
other two cannot possibly be interpreted without recourse to reli­
gion.30
30 “Gentoku,” KMZ, vol. 1, p. 351.
31 “Shinsei no dotoku,” in KMZ, vol. 3, pp. 264-67.
32 This was his “minimum possible” period when he was devoted to asceticism.
What marks this essay as something more than philosophy is Kiyozawa’s cri­
terion of anjin, a term denoting Buddhist liberation (sometimes used as a syn­
onym for the spiritual goal of shinjin[ii^]m Shinshu). This shows how even 
in this early, philosophical period, Kiyozawa saw and ultimately judged the 
value of any ethical system in terms of its religious benefit.
(2) Religion and Ethics
Another essay from the first period of Kiyozawa’s ethical writings that 
presages his deep concern for the relationship between ethics and religion in 
his final writings, is entitled “Shinsei no dotoku MEOil® (Morality of 
Truth),” written either in 1891 or 1892.31 Reflecting both his encounter with 
ethics as a central theme in European philosophy and the political situation 
in Japan, Kiyozawa puts aside his own renunciative sentiments32 in this short 
piece and concedes that morality is of utmost importance for individuals in 
order to function properly in society. He then critiques the rational morals and 
ethics devoid of any religious basis that are extolled by the utilitarians and 
social Darwinians because, he asserts, morality is finite and like all finite phe­
nomena, it is controlled ($£ffl) by means of infinite forces. Hence, moral 
instruction without a religious foundation only prepares people to deal with 
what is immediately confronting them, rendering them unable to think and 
act for long-term, higher objectives and thus dulling their sensitivity to reli­
gious truths.
“Shinsei no dotoku” also presents an interesting analysis of how jiriki (t 
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tj self-power) religion and tariki religion approach ethics or, in Kiyozawa’s 
approach, what ethics means to each form of religion. Reflecting Japanese 
terminology since the Kamakura period, jzrz'fa' religion refers to “traditional” 
forms of Buddhism wherein keeping monastic precepts and self-discipline 
aim at self-transformation to bring the individual to the goal of buddhahood; 
tariki religion denotes a position where lack of faith in the jiriki path moti­
vates the believer to direct his attention and practice to access powers beyond 
the known self, which usually means promises of assistance from buddhas 
and celestial bodhisattvas. Kiyozawa glosses jiriki religion as “attempting to 
reach the Infinite by means of personal training.” In that the jiriki focus is on 
“training the finite person,” morals are immediately relevant because they are 
part of that training (they form an important component of the Buddhist pre­
cepts, for example). This path is limited in its applicability, however, in that 
a person devoted to a jiriki religious existence shows little regard for moral 
questions outside the realm of his training. Turning to the tariki religious exis­
tence, Kiyozawa defines this as “using the power of the Infinite to enable one 
to reach the Infinite.” A person on this path is concerned about following the 
instructions manifest from the “sacred essence” and simply “does not worry 
himself about any other [behavioral] requirements.” Before he looks seriously 
at questions of ethics and morality relevant to the finite world, a person of 
tariki religion typically must reach his religious goal of an “immovably paci­
fied mind” based on the Infinite. This essay is therefore characterized by 
Kiyozawa’s strong support for the tradition of morals playing a prominent 
role in the jiriki path.33 The tariki path needs to keep the moral/ethical sphere 
separate from the religious one but should not denigrate it as a result. 
Borrowing a classic metaphor, Kiyozawa refers to them as two wings of a 
bird.34 He concludes by stating, “Therefore if someone seeks a religion where­
in morality is established as something separate, it is clear that they can only 
choose a tariki religion.” In other words, taz'zh'-based religions are the only 
ones wherein moral concerns do not interfere with the goal of religious expe­
rience. This sentiment is explained more elegantly in Interrelationship, which 
33 This stance seems to reflect his respect for the traditions of early Indian Buddhism and 
their traces among the Japanese schools, particularly Zen. In the early formulations of praxis 
such as the Eightfold Path, various forms of practice were often collected under three cate­
gories: morality (sila), wisdom (prajna), and meditation (d/ryana).
34 Metaphors like “two wings of a bird” or “two wheels of a cart” were often used in late 
Heian and Kamakura period writings to describe the relationship in Japanese society between 
the political realm and the Buddhist realm, usually termed bbb-buppo HEzSIZui (king’s law 
and buddha’s law).
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we will look at below, but it is worth noting here how remarkable this state­
ment is for the early 1890s, when a great many leaders in society regarded 
ethics as commensurate with, if not more significant, than religion.
Kiyozawa’s strong advocacy of the tariki position, coupled with the fact 
that he presents no other rubric for religious typology in this context, suggests 
a comparison with the Religiousness A-B model of Kierkegaard. By way of 
clarification, it should be mentioned that when Kiyozawa extols the tariki path 
as the only religious form that is not hindered by moral/ethical concerns, he 
is talking about Pure Land Buddhism. Not only is he excluding other forms 
of Buddhism practiced in Japan such as Zen, Tendai, Shingon, and Kegon but 
Christianity is never suggested here, either. Although in Kierkegaard, ethical 
attitudes are central to the discussion of the aesthetic and the ethical, his first 
two forms of “existence,” ethics clearly takes a secondary role in both 
Religiousness A and B because these categories are defined by the individ­
ual having attained a state when ethics ceases to be “an absolute telos.” In 
that Kiyozawa also looks at the significance of ethical concerns for Buddhism 
in “Shinsei no dotoku” as a component of the religious path rather than its 
goal, he and Kierkegaard share the same perspective; in other words, for 
Kiyozawa, too, ethics brings out our commitment from a sense of responsi­
bility that is both public and personal, but it should never be considered an 
absolute telos.
Interrelationship, written some eight years later, is a more considered, more 
elaborate look at this same question of ethics and religion. Here, Kiyozawa 
presents us with more concrete examples of the discourse concerning ethics 
among Japanese intellectuals at that time, that is, over the decade from 1892 
to 1902. He first examines the standpoint where religious individuals should 
serve the cause of social ethics, then the view that ethics should serve the inter­
ests of religion, and then the sort of fusion outlook that regards them as actu­
ally the same—that is, the rational and irrational aspects of the same “gestalt.” 
But his critical apparatus reveals he has moved to a position more radical than 
what we saw above, for now he states unambiguously that religion and ethics 
are best kept separate. Outlined in charts and descriptive definitions, 
Kiyozawa frames the issue as two distinct problems: ethics as the relation­
ship between individuals, and religion as the relationship between an indi­
vidual and the Absolute. Both are complex and difficult to discern in their 
own way but, stressing the subjective nature of the religious problem, in con­
tent they are fundamentally different. Therefore ethics should be addressed 
and taught by specialists who focus on human relations, and we should look
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to the professional religious for questions pertaining to that realm. Man is 
composed of both a finite (ethical) and an infinite (religious) nature, and his 
deep concern for both thus reflects something intrinsic in his existence. But 
in a statement that shows a consistency with his essays written ten years ear­
lier, Kiyozawa states with conviction that whatever is relative and finite in an 
ultimate sense “is dependent in all ways upon the Absolute, Infinite exis­
tence.”35
35 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 232.
In a statement reminiscent of Kierkegaard, in Interrelationship Kiyozawa 
states that we are naturally drawn to ethics as an authoritative system of 
thought and behavior not for religious reasons but from the desire for self­
fulfillment. Thus, the order of our understanding and commitment is one that 
begins in the search for individual fulfillment, and this leads to heightened 
ethical concerns in the hopes of finding satisfaction in taking obligatory and 
responsible action, calling to mind Kierkegaard’s move from the aesthetic to 
the ethical existence. But, as Kiyozawa then points out, one often experiences 
a disparity between ethical ideals and ethical action. The more serious one is 
about ethics, the more frustrated and insecure one becomes when trying to 
live the ethically correct life. This inevitably alienates the individual from 
his/her devotion to the ethical, leading to a deep appreciation for religious 
concerns. Beginning with Interrelationship and then further developed in 
Negotiating, we are thus walking a path that runs parallel to that of 
Kierkegaard, not only regarding the process of how one is devoted to first 
ethics, and then to religion, but also in explaining why. This is not to say that 
either Kierkegaard or Kiyozawa abandons ethical concerns altogether, but in 
struggling to explain the psychology of how an individual finds meaning 
through personal religious insight independent of participation in an institu­
tional religious tradition, both men require a certain rejection of socially nor­
mative behavior. Seen from the perspective of the problem of how one 
subjectively comes to religious liberation, then, the value of ethics manifests 
from an individual’s subjective need for meaning rather than as a natural 
expression of truth, religious or otherwise, and thus in essays like 
Interrelationship and Negotiating, ethics is treated as something ultimately 
instrumental.
(3) The Shinshu View of Ethics
Kiyozawa’s effort at clarifying his position of the relation between religion 
and ethics, reaches its peak in three essays: “Rinri ijo no an’i
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(The Solace Beyond Ethics),”36 written in 1902, “Rinri ijo no konkyo fraSEf 
±©88 (The Authority Beyond Ethics)”37 and Negotiating, both composed 
just months before his death in 1903. Although he had written about jiriki and 
tariki ethics previously, in “Rinri ijo no an’i” he brings Shinran’s voice into 
the discussion of ethics for the first time, probably reflecting his own con­
frontation with finitude. Here Kiyozawa quotes what is now a famous state­
ment attributed to Shinran, “I know nothing about the dual matter of good 
and evil,” taken from the epilogue of the Tannisho, a text Kiyozawa is cred­
ited with bringing back into Shinshu orthodoxy. Here is the complete passage 
in the Tannisho'.
36 Ibid.,pp. 121-24.
37 Ibid., pp. 132-34.
38 T. No. 2661, 85.734c20, Shinshu seiten, pp. 640-41 and elsewhere. Compare with trans­
lations of the Tannisho by Taitetsu Unno, Tannisho: A Shin Buddhist Classic (Honolulu: 
Buddhist Study Center Press: 2nd rev. ed., 1996), 34; and The Collected Works of Shinran vol. 
I,p. 679.
39 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 122.
Our Venerable Teacher said, ‘I know nothing about the dual mat­
ter of good and evil. For, were I to thoroughly understand what good 
is in the same way that the Tathagata Ami da considers this matter 
in his own mind, then I would [certainly] know when something 
was good. Were I to thoroughly understand evil in the same way 
that the Tathagata understands it, then I would know when some­
thing was evil. But as a foolish being besotted with mental afflic­
tions (klesa), [I find that] whatever is said about anything in this 
burning house of an impermanent world is not to be believed; noth­
ing is genuine (makoto). Only the nenbutsu alone is genuine.38
Kiyozawa’s gloss on this statement illustrates its relevance for religion and 
ethics. He explains that the passage instructs the believer
to throw off all notions of self, lift up the mind and hurl it into the 
ocean of the Tathagata, wherein all things become the work of the 
majestic power of the Tathagata, distinctions as to right and wrong 
or good and evil disappear even further, and all one can see is the 
activity of this majestic power.39
In other words, until cinjin, or religious attainment, is achieved, on what basis 
are we to have confidence in our ethical judgments? Here Kiyozawa does not 
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entertain even the possibility of a telos of ethics prior to religious awakening, 
although he was of course aware that that is precisely what some of his con­
temporaries such as Kato Hiroyuki were doing. Kiyozawa’s rhetoric of urg­
ing his readers to cast off self and mind into the ocean of the Buddha is 
strikingly active, more of a piece with later Kyoto School thinkers like Nishida 
and Nishitani than the usual depictions of Shinshu religiosity as passivily 
acceptance of the workings of the Buddha. In Kierkegaard’s theology of the 
absolute transcendence of God standing over the individual, we instead see a 
stress on the given fact that “this single human being is before God.”40 On 
the other hand, this abandoning of self brings a result that is very much akin 
to the Religiousness B we saw above; that is, total reliance on the transcen­
dent other, the source of infinite knowledge and truth. Returning to the “Rinri 
ijo no an’i,” after his statement about the admitted inability to discern good 
and evil, Kiyozawa then asks what the limits of ethical responsibility would 
reasonably be for someone so honest about their inability to discern right from 
wrong. Would such an attitude pennit that person to take any action without 
consequences—could he kill his parents, for example? He answers that the 
fact that such questions arise reflects a common misunderstanding of human 
behavior, for the motivation for something like murder stems from a strong 
assertion of self while he is advocating a world-view where the sense of self 
within the individual is completely gone.
40 Kierkegaard 1980, p. 117.
If we lay the rhetoric structure of the above essay next to Kierkegaard’s 
model of aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence in two stages, it would 
appear that Kiyozawa is moving in a similar pattern except that he is skipping 
the Religiousness A step and jumping directly from ethical existence to the 
final stage of religious existence, Religiousness B. But in fact jiriki Buddhism 
plays the corresponding role of Kierkegaard’s Religiousness A, for Kiyozawa 
recognizes it as legitimate religious awareness but limited in its reward, ulti­
mately most valuable for clarifying what is special about tariki Buddhism. 
The lack of a detailed description of the experience of jiriki religion is prob­
ably due to a more direct approach characteristic of his final years rather than 
any disparagement toward it. That is, missing in these late essays is the care­
ful delineation that we saw in his earlier writings of how the jiriki and tariki 
aspects of Buddhism would approach the problem of ethics and religion dif­
ferently, as Kiyozawa’s concerns are dominated by a new urgency to com­
municate the Shinshu point of view. This intensity is perhaps most 
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pronounced in Negotiating, his final essay on this topic.
In Negotiating the specific Shinshu spiritual attainment known as shinjin 
enters the ethical discussion for the first time. Admittedly, in “Gentoku” 
Kiyozawa frequently resorts to the term anjin to express the Buddhist notion 
of liberation or attainment, and this term does have an identity in the writings 
of Rennyo and other Pure Land thinkers in Japan, stemming from the Honen 
tradition. But anjin, the “pacified mind,” is rather a generic term for awak­
ening or emancipation in East Asian Buddhism as a whole, and is not uncom­
mon in Zen writings, for example. But with few exceptions, shinjin, or “the 
believing (or “entrusting”) mind” is a term specific to Shinran and the lin­
eage stemming from him.41 So although in content the two words may be 
interchangeable when Kiyozawa discusses the relationship of religion and 
ethics to shinjin, he is specifically indicating the Shinshu perspective in 
Negotiating.
41 The word shinjin was used by other Pure Land thinkers in the Kamakura period in the 
Honen lineage, but although it later became a key concept for Shinran’s Jodo Shinshu, it was 
never adopted by Jodoshu, the other major Pure Land school in Japan and has thus come to 
resonate particularly strongly with believers in that tradition.
As one reads Negotiating, it becomes clear that Kiyozawa has reached a 
point of frustration on the subject of ethics. As pointed out above, it is not a 
rejection of the value of ethics per se (as some have misunderstood), but a 
revulsion toward the authority placed in systems of ethics that have no plau­
sible religious or philosophical grounding. As he reminds his readers more 
than once, notions of right and wrong are generally driven by social condi­
tions rather than deep insight into human nature; forthat reason they are muta­
ble and their mutable nature precludes them from any religious authority. The 
paradoxes inherent in ethical idealism both in discerning what the most 
responsible ethical response should be for a given problem and in the actual 
carrying out of the “proper” action in the expression of that response, stem 
from this lack of transcendent authority. Kiyozawa offers a compromise solu­
tion here: let the professional ethicists be responsible for ethics rather than the 
professional religious. An ethicist devotes his/her life to studying the condi­
tions of society and is thus in the best position to argue what ethical standards 
are most appropriate for that society. A monk or nun, on the other hand, is 
devoted to penetrating the meaning of the Dharma for the purpose of liberat­
ing himself/herself and others from the dilemmas and defilements of their 
own consciousnesses. One is a social matter, taking place on the plane of 
human relations; the other is internal and intensely personal, focusing on prob­
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lems within the mind of an individual. The ethicist is no more qualified to 
teach religion than the monk is to teach ethics.
We know from other writings that Kiyozawa was also frustrated at the 
Buddhist clergy. In “Bukkyosha, nanzo jicho sezaruya 
(Buddhists, Why do you Lack Self-Respect?),”42 he rails at the obsequious­
ness of monks toward government officials and the wealthy. Living at a time 
when the curriculum for ethical instruction was mandated by the Ministry of 
Education and that the curriculum had strongly political overtones, it is not 
surprising that Kiyozawa would define the “sphere of ethics” as something 
only social (i.e., secular) in nature, as he does in Negotiating. To those unsym­
pathetic with the government’s expansionist policies, the concept of ethics in 
late-Meiji Japan probably seemed like little more than obligatory political ide­
ology. Thus, his critique of the role of monks as teachers of morals and ethics 
is not only motivated by a need to remind his readership of the importance of 
each person clarifying their own religious identities, but also to admonish the 
Buddhist clergy to return to their primary obligation: serving the spiritual 
needs of the people, accomplished by putting Buddhist values first, by mak­
ing efforts to deepen their own spirituality through the study and practice of 
things religious, and by making themselves available to their communities in 
these roles.
42 KMZ, vol. 7, pp. 139-44
The way Kiyozawa contrasts the ethical and the religious realms in all these 
essays is strikingly similar to Kierkegaard’s description of the process where­
by an individual’s identity undergoes a change from being dominated by eth­
ical to religious concerns. It can thus be argued that we are essentially seeing 
the same values at work in both thinkers. Given that Kiyozawa was bom less 
than a decade after Kierkegaard’s death, this inevitably brings forth the ques­
tion as to whether Kiyozawa could have known of Kierkegaard’s ideas and 
thus, been influenced by him. Let us now consider that possibility.
Kierkegaard in Meiji Japan
Although philosophers and scholars of comparative religion have found much 
to compare and contrast between Kierkegaard and Shinran, I am not aware of 
any study that considers the possible influence of Kierkegaard on any spe­
cific thinker, Shinshu or otherwise, in the Meiji period. It is therefore under­
standable that no one has thus far considered the possibility of Kierkegaardian 
influence upon Kiyozawa. Indeed the obvious signs of interest in Kierkegaard 
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in Japan prior to Kiyozawa’s death in 1903 are absent: the first published 
essay title in Japanese that includes Kierkegaard’s name does not appear until 
1906, the first Japanese translation of Kierkegaard not until 1911, and the first 
monograph devoted to Kierkegaard (written by Watsuji Tetsuro) is not pub­
lished until 1915.43 Moreover, there is no mention of Kierkegaard in any of 
Kiyozawa’s writings and no evidence of Kierkegaard’s viewpoint in 
Kiyozawa’s outline of religious philosophy presented in the Skeleton.
43 Watsuji 1915.
44 There is a copy of this English translation in the list of books in Kiyozawa’s library, so 
we know that he had his own personal copy. Although the date of that work is not known, 
Kierkegaard is mentioned on p. 346 of vol. 2 of Friedrich Uberweg, History of Philosophy, 
from Thales to the Present Time, tr. G. Morris (New York: Scribner & Armstrong: 1874). On 
Kiyozawa’s utilization of Uberweg, see Patricia Honda, “Kiyozawa Manshi and the Skeleton 
of the Philosophy of Religion, ” unpublished M. A. thesis, Otani University.
45 His full name was Georg Moms Cohen Brandes. See Hertel and Kristensen 1980. See 
also Anderson 1990 and Nolin 1976.
But that presumption needs to be reconsidered. Skeleton was published in 
1892, the same period of his first essays on ethics, but some seven years before 
the appearance of his mature ethical writings that are characterized by a more 
prominent role for religion. Moreover, it has been shown that in writing 
Skeleton, Kiyozawa relied heavily on an English translation of a two-volume 
history of philosophy by Friedrich Uberweg, particularly in discussing how 
different philosophers have understood religion, and Uberweg’s work does 
indeed discuss Kierkegaard, albeit not in any great detail.44 There is also evi­
dence that after 1895 (and particularly after 1901) a number of specific peo­
ple connected with the philosophy program at then Tokyo Imperial University 
began to look at Kierkegaard as a result of greater attention directed toward 
him in Europe, and there are enough connections between some of these indi­
viduals and Kiyozawa to suggest the likelihood that Kiyozawa also learned 
about Kierkegaard through contact with them. Although Kiyozawa himself 
did not travel to Europe, many of these individuals did, and as an avid stu­
dent of trends in European thought, it is entirely plausible that Kiyozawa also 
learned about Kierkegaard at the end of the 1890s when such travel became 
more common. Here is what we known about the flow of Kierkegaardian ideas 
into Japan in the six or seven years prior to Kiyozawa’s death in 1903.
The story begins within Denmark itself. The first serious effort to reha­
bilitate Kierkegaard after his death was made by the Danish writer Georg 
Brandes (1842-1927), a literary scholar and critic who, though raised as an 
atheistic Jew, was deeply shaken as a young man upon reading Kierkegaard.45
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The publication in 1877 of Brandes’ monograph, Saren Kierkegaard: A 
Critical Presentation in Outline Form, which takes the form of a psycholog­
ical biography, was not only “the first of its kind in Kierkegaard research,”46 
but also a milestone in Denmark as a work of modem, critical thinking. By 
1879, Brandes’ work had already appeared in German translation.
46 Mortenson 1996, p. 37.
47 Hoffding 1882.
48 Hoffding 1888.
49 See Lowndes 1891.
50 The first five chapters of Hoffding’s work were published under the title Shinrigaku ES
so the final edition came out as Kdsei kaiteiban shinrigaku (Tokyo:
Kobundo, 1897).
51 Masugata 1989, p. 51. There is also a Japanese version of this paper at <http:// 
kierkegaard.cs.kyoto-wu.ac.jp/masugata/juyoshil.html>.
Influenced by Brandes’ study was Harald Hoffding (1843-1931), arguably 
the most influential Danish philosopher of the second-half of the nineteenth 
century. In 1882, he published An Outline of Psychology’ on the Basis of 
Experience and Ethics,47 48and in 1888, Outlines of Ethicsd3 In 1887 and 1888, 
these were both published in German translation. They appeared in English 
as early as 1891,49 and the English translation oi An Outline of Psychology 
was purchased by the Tokyo Imperial University Library. Japanese students 
of philosophy began to read Hoffding soon after these translations appeared, 
and Kierkegaard’s thought is featured in both works. Evidence of Hoffding’s 
impact in Japan can be found in the fact that Inoue Tetsujiro (1855—
1944), who had studied in Germany between 1884 and 1890 and later became 
a professor of philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University upon his return, payed 
a visit to Hoffding at his home in Copenhagen in 1889 en route to a confer­
ence in Sweden. Further evidence that the Japanese were reading Hoffding is 
found in the fact that Ishida Shintaro (1870-1927) in 1895 pub­
lished a translation of the first five chapters of Hoffding’s An Outline of 
Psychology, and then in 1897 put out a revised and completed translation.50 
Kierkegaard’s name appeared for the first time in print in Japanese in Chapter 
Six of Ishida’s 1897 edition in a Japanized German pronunciation as 
Kierukega’aruto.5I In 1884-85, Hoffding completed a massive two-volume 
compendium of nineteenth century Danish philosophy within which 
Kierkegaard is discussed in significant detail; this work was translated into 
German in 1895-96. An English translation appeared in 1900, a copy of which 
was also acquired by Tokyo Imperial University Library. In 1892, Hoffding
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published the monograph Soren Kierkegaard as Philosopher,52 which was 
translated into German in 18 9 6.53 54The 1896 German and 1900 English trans­
lations of Hoffding’s A History of Modern Philosophy56" were also purchased 
by the Tokyo Imperial University Library. Note that Kiyozawa returns to 
Tokyo in 1899 to found Shinshu University (later renamed Otani) and is there 
until 1902.
52 Hoffding 1892.
53 Hoffding 1902.
54 Hoffding 1894-95. English title: A History of'Modern Philosophy: A Sketch of the History 
of Philosophy from the Close of the Renaissance to Our Own Day, trans, by Meyer, 1900. In 
addition, in 1901 Hoffding published Philosophy of Religion, Danish title Religionfilosofi. A. 
German translation came out the same year, but this was not translated into English, also by 
Meyer, until 1906.
55 Onishi contributed greatly to the appreciation of modem Danish thought in Japan by pub­
lishing “Denmakoku tetsugaku no kinkyo Hin Tetsugakkai zasshi St
SS, 5:54-55 (1891), pp. 1106-1112 and 1159-1176, based on a German translation of an arti­
cle by Knud Ibsen (“Die daenische Philosophie des letzten Jahrzehnts”) centering on Hoffd­
ing.
56 Masugata 1989, p. 50.
57 Mortensen 1996, p. 39.
Onishi Hajime AffiK (1864-1900) also played an important role in intro­
ducing Kierkegaard’s ideas to Japan. Brought up by devout Christian parents, 
Onishi studied at Doshisha High School before entering Tokyo Imperial 
University, where he graduated in philosophy, studying under Inoue 
Tetsujiro. Onishi became fascinated by Danish philosophy, and mentions 
Hoffding twice in his graduation thesis.55 While still a student, Onishi was 
hired in 1891 to teach psychology, ethics, and logic at Tokyo Speciality 
School (Tokyo Senmon Gakko, the forerunner of Waseda University), and 
used Hoffding’s Outlines of Psychology as one of his textbooks.56 During a 
brief study trip to Germany in 1898, Onishi devoted considerable time to tak­
ing notes on Hoffding’s Kierkegaard as Philosopher, and he is thought to 
have been influential during his short career.57
Another avenue in which Kierkegaard’s ideas reached Japan during 
Kiyozawa’s lifetime was via his impact on Scandinavian writers of fiction. 
Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) and August Strindberg (1849-1912), whose new, 
psychological approach to literature and theatre had a deep impact on late- 
nineteenth century European thought, were heavily influenced by 
Kierkegaard. Brandes also had a large role to play here, as he advanced the 
interpretation of Kierkegaardian influence in Ibsen, and it was Brandes who
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personally introduced Strindberg to the ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. 
The views of Brandes, Ibsen, Strindberg, and Nietzsche all figure prominently 
in Berlin’s so-called Modernist movement in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, a side-effect of which was the airing of Kierkegaard’s ideas stem­
ming primarily from an 1890 German translation of a Brandes essay on Ibsen. 
In 1892, Tsubouchi Shoyo (1859-1935) introduced Ibsen’sJ Doll’s
House and An Enemy of the People to Japan in two articles published in 
Waseda bungaku In the next year both plays appeared in
Japanese translation and Tsubouchi began to produce them for the stage in 
Tokyo. According to the initial interpretation of Brandes, the main character 
in Ibsen’s play Bran was, in fact, based on Kierkegaard. It is Tsubouchi who 
hired the above-mentioned Onishi Hajime at Waseda, and Onishi also pub­
lished two pieces on Ibsen in 1894, also largely following the interpretations 
of Brandes. Onishi discussed the anti-Christian sentiment in Ibsen, but did 
not go so far as to identify Kierkegaard as Ibsen’s major theological influ­
ence, or to identify the main character of Bran as Kierkegaard himself. In 
1901, the nationalist Takayama Chogyu KlLjWA1 (1871-1902), another stu­
dent of Inoue Tetsujiro, published an article comparing Ibsen and Nietzsche 
that also basically followed Brandes; the death of Nietzsche in 1900 led many 
to romanticize what they saw as an extreme individualism in idealized 
thinkers like Nietzsche, Ibsen, and Kierkegaard.58 9
58 These are contained in the section called “Jibun hyoron” ALUUm in Waseda bungaku 
No. 27 (1892), p. 28, and No. 28 (1892), p. 7.
59 Takayama 1901.
60 The original title is simply Henrik Ibsen, which was translated and combined with anoth­
er essay in Morrison and Muir 1899.
But in the meantime Brandes himself, based on a conversation with Ibsen, 
had been rethinking his position. He went through a “second impression” that 
rejected his previous identification of the Bran character with Kierkegaard 
and instead understood it to be based on another anti-church Christian named 
Adolphe Lammers. Yet once again he underwent a “third impression” in 
which he concluded the character was a fusion of both Kierkegaard and 
Lammers. This was all contained in a study of Ibsen that Brandes published 
in 1898, and which appeared in English in 18 99.60 Takayama Chogyu fol­
lowed Inoue Tetsujiro politically at that time, and Tsubouchi came out strong­
ly opposing the nationalistic writings of both, particularly those of Takayama 
that promoted Nietzche’s thought. This led to a public dispute concerning the 
relationship of the individual to the State among Takayama, Tsubouchi, Mori 
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Ogai (1862-1922), and Shimamura Hogetsu SLHSkl (1871-1918), to 
name but a few, and in which the interpretation of Ibsen’s Bran often served 
as the point of contention. As a personal friend of Ibsen and the major Danish 
interpreter of Ibsen at that time, highly influential in Germany as well, 
Brandes’ own interpretive revisions were well scrutinized in Tokyo when his 
book on Ibsen came out in English in 1900.61 It is in this context in 1906 that 
a former student of Onishi named Kaneko Chikusui tfc-Hhvk (1870-1937) 
published the first article in Japan devoted entirely to Kierkegaard, where he 
argued against the ultra-individualism of Takayama Chogyu, who was argu­
ing for the first Brandesian view of Bran.
61 Mori Ogai was a physician, but more influential as novelist, translator, and playwright. 
See Bowring, 1979. Shimamura Hogetsu was a student at Waseda (Tokyo Senmon Gakko) 
under both Tsubouchi and Onishi who, after graduation, went on to study in England and 
Germany, later teaching at Waseda himself, and gaining fame as a theatrical director and lit­
erary critic. See Marra, 2001, for a description of the thought of Tsubouchi, Mori, Onishi, 
Shimamura, Takayama, and others.
62 Mortensen 1996, p. 39, but he gives no source for this information.
There are other areas related to philosophy in which traces of Kierkegaard 
may be found prior to the death of Kiyozawa. One of the foreign scholars 
teaching philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University, Erich von Krober (1848- 
1914), a lecturer in the philosophy program from 1893 until 1914 is said to 
have given “lectures on Kierkegaard.”62 In 1901, the English scholar J. M. 
Baldwin published a Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion with an entry for 
Kierkegaard, and this book was not only purchased by the Tokyo Imperial 
University Library but we also know it was well-read among its philosophy 
students, for when Tomonaga Sanjuro SIzkZ+lT (1871-1951) wrote his 
Tetsugaku jiten gWA (Dictionary of Philosophy), published in 1905, his 
article on Kierkegaard was little more than a translation from Baldwin.
There is thus ample evidence of Kierkegaard’s ideas circulating among 
Japanese intellectuals in the decade prior to Kiyozawa’s death, particularly 
among philosophy students and teachers at Tokyo Imperial University where 
he had attended. There are three individuals who stand out, however, as having 
had the strongest possibility of influencing Kiyozawa directly in this area. 
Probably the most likely person with whom Kiyozawa would have discussed 
Kierkegaard is Tomonaga Sanjuro, the author of the Tetsugaku jiten—the first 
dictionary of Western philosophy published in Japan. In addition to the fact 
that Tomonaga was aware of Kierkegaard from his reliance on Baldwin’s 
work, it is also certain that he knew Kiyozawa personally. Both graduated 
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from the same philosophy program at Tokyo Imperial University, and upon 
graduation in 1898 Tomonaga was hired immediately by Kiyozawa as phi­
losophy lecturer at the new Shinshu Daigaku. When Kiyozawa moved this 
school to Tokyo in 1901, Tomonaga agreed to move as well, and remained at 
the school until taking a position at Kyoto Imperial University in 1907, some 
time after Kiyozawa’s death. Not only was Tomonaga working under 
Kiyozawa at a time when they were probably the only two teachers of Western 
philosophy at the college, but like Kiyozawa, Tomonaga was also a Higashi 
Honganji Shinshu follower who had studied Hegel, and when Kiyozawa 
launched his new journal, Seishinkai in 1900, from the veiy first volume 
Tomonaga was among its active contributors.63 The two others from whom 
Kiyozawa may have learned something about Kierkegaard were Onishi 
Hajime and his teacher Inoue Tetsujiro. Both read Hoffding closely, both were 
familiar with Hoffding’s writings on Kierkegaard, and Inoue actually visited 
Hoffding at his home in Copenhagen. While Inoue and his colleague Erich 
von Krober may have lectured on Kierkegaard at Tokyo Imperial University 
during Kiyozawa’s lifetime, this would have taken place after Kiyozawa had 
left the institution. On the other hand, like Tomonaga, Onishi was a likely 
candidate to have discussed Kierkegaard with Kiyozawa directly. As 
Kiyozawa was only one year older than Onishi, they spent a number of years 
together in the same philosophy program at Tokyo Imperial University and 
both were personally religious. Onishi viewed Inoue’s nationalism with the 
same disdain as Kiyozawa and we know that he went to Germany at least part­
ly if not wholly to study Kierkegaard, so it is all but certain they discussed 
Kierkegaard at some point in their friendship. It should be noted, however, 
that their communication on this or any other subject after Onishi’s return 
from Germany may have been limited because in 1899 Onishi moved to Kyoto 
to take up a position at the newly-formed Kyoto Imperial University, the same 
year Kiyozawa moved to Tokyo with his newly-constituted Shinshu 
University. Onishi also became sick while in Germany, and died in 1900, only 
one year after his return.
Consider that all these men, Kiyozawa included, were products of the phi­
losophy department at Tokyo Imperial University where both faculty and stu­
dents studied the works of Hoffding and lectures on Kierkegaard are thought 
to have been given. We also know of at least one book in Kiyozawa’s library 
that mentioned Kierkegaard, and even if we cannot confirm Kiyozawa’s per-
63 Tomonaga has two articles from the very first year of publication. See Tomonaga 1901a 
and 1901b.
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sonal interest in Ibsen, Strindberg and the debate surrounding Ibsen’s play 
Bran and the impact of the interpretations of the critic Brandes, Kierkegaard’s 
views by 1900 had clearly become a topic of conversation among students of 
Western philosophy and culture. Thus we may safely conclude that Kiyozawa 
probably did know the name of Kierkegaard and something of his thought. 
But considering the complexity of Kierkegaard’s writings, much of them in 
fictional format, the lack of any Japanese translations or published writings 
devoted to Kierkegaard studies within Kiyozawa’s lifetime, and his absence 
from all of Kiyozawa’s surveys of Western philosophy, it is highly unlikely 
that Kiyozawa read any of Kierkegaard’s writings. We may therefore surmise 
that the likelihood that Kiyozawa did know something about Kierkegaard 
should be considered quite high. But absent any direct evidence that 
Kiyozawa himself was reading Hoffding, whatever knoweldge he may have 
held was probably limited to what he learned from short summaries found in 
surveys such as those of Ubeiweg and Baldwin, or conversations from friends 
like Onishi and Tomonaga. If the instances of parallel ideas appear only in 
Kiyozawa’s latter “ethics and religion” phase, it would strongly suggest the 
possibility that we are indeed seeing the influence of one thinker upon the 
other, but in fact most of Kiyozawa’s conclusions are presaged in the ethical 
writings from his early period, long before Onishi went to study in Germany 
and interpretations of Ibsen and Brandes were debated among Tokyo intel­
lectuals.
In other words, Kiyozawa did not need Kierkegaard to reach very similar 
if not the same conclusions about religion and ethics, but we should not rule 
out the possibility that learning of Kierkegaard in the period between 1898 
and 1902 helped clarify his thinking.
Truth in Need
Above, I have tried to illustrate the fundamental positions held on the rela­
tionship between ethics and religion in Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard with an 
eye to their similarities, which are many. I have also sought to uncover what 
we know about the introduction of Kierkegaard’s thought into Japan during 
Kiyozawa’s lifetime to consider the possibility that those similarities reflect 
influence. This inquiry has been motivated by a desire to understand the rad­
ical stance that both of these religious thinkers take toward ethics. What is 
most striking, of course, is that both thinkers discuss the allure to the indi­
vidual of devotion to ethics in what is called a teleology in the West or ikigai 
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in Japanese, that is, an ultimate source of meaning and authority, and that both 
conclude that despite enormous social pressure in support of such a world­
view, it is doomed to failure because of its contingent nature. In Kiyozawa’s 
language, this is the limitation of worldly (samvrti) or relative truth, a 
Buddhist notion that includes religious truth, and both strongly affirm that 
true self-affirmation only comes through an opening up to the realm of the 
Absolute, a move that, at least in its experience as a momentary “leap,” is 
inherently nonrational, nonsocial, and nonethical.
Such conclusions are not unique to these thinkers but given their historical 
contexts, for both men to have published such ideas so explicitly to such a 
wide readership when the prevailing ideological winds in their respective 
societies were blowing in the opposite direction reflects unusual strength of 
conviction. Thus, we inevitably return to the question raised above of whether 
Kiyozawa could have known about and been influenced by the prior exam­
ple of Kierkegaard. There are two final points I would like to put forward, 
one historical and one philosophical.
First, concerning the question of influence, I believe I have shown that 
although Kiyozawa died before any translations or detailed studies of 
Kierkegaard appeared in Japanese, his name was known among intellectuals 
interested in Western philosophy and theatre through materials in English and 
German. How much of Kierkegaard’s standpoint was understood in Japan is 
another matter, however. We do have discussion of Kierkegaard in a book 
that we know was in Kiyozawa’s personal library and was something he used 
extensively as a sourcebook for his own writings, and we know that Kiyozawa 
did have communication with individuals who were interested in Kierkegaard 
such as Onishi Hajime and Tomonaga Sanjuro. On the other hand, we have 
no evidence that Kiyozawa actually discussed Kierkegaard with these friends, 
and neither he nor Ibsen nor Brandes is mentioned in any of Kiyozawa’s extant 
writings.
But it would be a mistake to state with confidence that Kiyozawa did not 
know of Kierkegaard merely because he is not mentioned in Kiyozawa’s var­
ious outlines of Western philosophy. For example, in Volume Five of the 
Iwanami edition of his collected works is a series of short pieces, based on a 
series of lectures given on major thinkers in Western philosophy between the 
years 1889 and 1892, and in addition to the fact that Kierkegaard is not found 
here, we do find others who lived at the same time or even later, such as Comte 
(1798-1857), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Schelling (1775-1854), 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and even Spencer (1820-1903) and Eduard von 
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Hartman (1842-1906), who Kiyozawa notes was still living at the time he 
wrote his essay.64 While this does suggest that Kiyozawa did not know enough 
of Kierkegaard to warrant even a short essay on his thought, it is important to 
remember that Kierkegaard was not a major object of study even in Europe 
at that time and essentially unknown in Japan. Danish was a completely inac­
cessible language in Japan during the mid and late Meiji period, as Japanese 
scholars depended entirely upon German and English publications of prima­
ry and secondary works on philosophy. While a German edition of Brandes’ 
monograph on Kierkegaard appears as early as 1879, it is really the work of 
Harald Hoffding that draws attention to him in a major way in both Europe 
and Japan. Thus it is not until the 1891 publication of the English translation 
of Hoffding’s Outline of Psychology that Japanese students have the oppor­
tunity to read about Kierkegaard, and not until 1897 that his name first appears 
in Japanese in a translation of this work. Kierkegaard’s absence from both 
Kiyozawa’s lectures of 1889-1892, or his monograph Shiikyd tetsugaku 
gaikotsu dated 1892, is to be expected and these works alone do not preclude 
the possiblity that Kiyozawa had known about Kierkegaard. This situation 
changes dramatically, however, in the decade following the publication of 
Skeleton in 1893, that is, the last decade of Kiyozawa’s life. In addition to the 
Japanese translation of Outline of Psychology, Hoffding’s Kierkegaard as 
Philosopher appears in German (1898) and English (1900). Kiyozawa’s phi­
losophy classmate at Tokyo Imperial University, Onishi Hajime publishes 
two articles on Ibsen (1894) and studies Kierkegaard while in Germany 
(1898). Lecturer Erich von Krober arrives at Tokyo Imperial University 
(1893) and lectures on Kierkegaard. Tomonaga Sanjuro, a junior colleague 
from the same philosophy department, who includes Kierkegaard in a refer­
ence work on philosophy, is hired by Kiyozawa at Shinshu University (1898). 
Brandes’ study of Ibsen, replete with his Kierkegaardian interpretations, 
appears in English (1899), and a literary controversy erupts in Japan over 
interpreting Ibsen’s Bran (1900) in which the Brandes interpretation is cen­
tral. I am merely restating the grounds for the above conclusion that Kiyozawa 
had numerous opportunities to learn about Kierkegaard in his later years, par­
ticularly after 1898. But while he may have been enouraged or inspired by 
Kierkegaard during his second period of addressing the religion/ethics conun­
drum that begins in 1899, despite their similar approach there is not enough 
64 LabeLled kinsei tetsugaku and kinsei tetsugaku hoi ifitklS# Sifi, this material
can be found in KMZ, vol. 5, pp. 149-422.
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evidence to conclude that Kiyozawa borrowed from him, consciously or 
unconsciously.
But even if new evidence emerged that conclusively demonstrated 
Kiyozawa’s borrowing of something from Kierkegaard, it would be entirely 
erroneous to reduce Kiyozawa’s stance on religion and ethics to something 
like a Shinshu interpretation of Kierkegaard. Kiyozawa’s stance on the prob­
lem of ethics is Mahayana in origin and is, as I have shown, very much part 
of the doctrinal legacy of Shinran, at least Shinran as represented in the 
Tannishd. Therefore, rather than argue influence, I would like to suggest 
something of a common principle that underlies the writings of both men, 
what may be called an “existential religious need.”
While admittedly Ricouer’s point about the lack of common philosophical 
agenda among the so-called founders of Existentialism is problematic, the 
adjective “existential” is nonetheless useful for expressing matters of deep 
concern pertaining to the meaning of one’s own existence. Whether or not 
one believes in the reality of identity independent of environment, the per­
ception by the individual of his or her own subjectivity may, at times of cri­
sis, lead to existential issues—that is, issues of fundamental importance to the 
concept of self and its relation to the world. In this sense, we not only find 
what may be identified as an existential religious need in both thinkers, a sense 
that their identities rest in some fundamental way upon clarification of cer­
tain religious questions, but we find this imperative stands at the very core of 
their conclusions about ethics.
As ethics is about man’s place in the world among other men, creatures, 
and today even inorganic substances, this need may be somewhat clearer 
when we recall the worlds the two men lived in. Although delayed for his­
torical and geographical reasons, Kiyozawa’s Japan did experience the same 
deconstructing of religious norms brought on by the European Enlightenment, 
and he and Kierkegaard both lived in States that were growing ever more pow­
erful in their ability to demand behavioral norms from their citizens. These 
governments were able to exploit a presumed moral authority derived from 
an even grander political and religious authority, and that moral authority was 
often expressed in terms of ethics. While the upheaval in the early and mid- 
Meiji period is well documented for scholars of Japan, Denmark in the first 
half of the nineteenth century was similarly destabilized by the French 
Revolution. These similar social situations were undoubtedly relevant to the 
“choice” or “realization” by both men of a religious path over an ethical one 
when the two are seen as serving different, and for these two thinkers, com­
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peting goals. But it is also important to keep in mind that both men did not 
rationalize their valorizations of the religious authority they had discovered 
on the basis of social instability or the lack of moral authority in the ruling 
powers in their respective cultures. Each describes an awakening to a reli­
gious authority that lay beyond or behind the ethical authority of social cus­
tom and even established religious institutions. Whatever occurs to turn one’s 
outlook from the ethical to the religious, by the term “religious existence” 
Kierkegaard was indicating not merely a new appreciation of religion, but a 
new identity constructed from religious culture, or more specifically religious 
experience itself, wherein the “teleology of ethics” had been deconstructed 
and ethics had thereby assumed a secondary role. Although Kiyozawa did not 
construct the same elaborate fictional display, his direct approach was no less 
plausible precisely because it presumed the authority of religious values and 
the authority of subjective experience. In other words, both Kiyozawa and 
Kierkegaard used the modem objectification of subjectivity to locate a reli­
gious authority for the individual in that subjectivity.
One way in which this need was expressed came in the distance that both 
writers felt from Hegel. In contrast to Kierkegaard’s repeated dismissal of 
Hegel’s view of ethics, which is well known, Kiyozawa was not so explicit. 
But while a sound analysis of Kiyozawa’s feelings about Hegel is yet to be 
written, from the above discussion we may infer a similar rejection of the 
Kant/Hegel notion of universal, rational ethical principles expressing some 
kind of Higher Spirit. Most interesting in this regard is the fact that Kiyozawa 
expresses this sentiment not only in the later “religious” phase of his life, but 
even in “Gentoku,” written in 1891. The monograph Skeleton also displayed 
seeds of doubt in the authority of ethical systems, and this doubt blossomed 
into the instrumental thesis, argued a decade later, that ethical concerns are 
valued precisely because they lead to realization of a religious truth that may 
contradict well-accepted ethical norms. Kierkegaard never goes so far as to 
argue for instrumentality, but he is similarly aware that belief in an absolute 
moral law regardless of the existence of God, or belief that religion’s prima­
ry ethical role is to sanctify the existing social norms of behavior, inevitably 
subverts religion because ethics should be based on religious truth and not the 
reverse. But when Kierkegaard asserts that belief in ethics as moral law 
inevitably “must repudiate Christianity, since it (Christianity) demands a tran­
scendence of the purely ethical,”65 he is taking the identical position as 
65 Rudd 1993, p. 146
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Kiyozawa in that idealized or “true” religion stands outside of any particular 
ethical scheme and by its authority subsumes it.
Thus we may conclude that ethical coherence for both thinkers ultimately 
fails and ultimately falls away before their greater need for religious honesty, 
however incoherent that stance may turn out to be. Their true needs were spir­
itual. Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard both take their readers through a similar 
process whereby religious need results from realization of the limitations of 
what an individual can do in the areas of ethical practice, religious practice, 
and religious faith. The Kiyozawa essay “Tariki shinko no hottoku TjISffl 
(Gaining Other-Power Faith, 1899)” frames the process of grasping 
faith in terms of subjective reflection on the implications of personal finitude:
The Infinite is just the other side of the finite; but we cannot gain 
any understanding of the Infinite without first [working to] grasp 
the finite. Thus our first task must be to clarify what this finite is. 
When religion does not flourish in the world, when morality is not 
practiced in the world, it stems in the main from man’s ignorance 
about his own finitude.66
66 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 214.
67 In Kierkegaard 1992b, p. 318.
We find a similar approach in Kierkegaard’s essay “To Need God is a Human 
Being’s Highest Perfection,” where he affirms that a religious understanding 
of self-knowledge is really about knowing one’s own limitations:
People do say that not to know oneself is a deception and an imper­
fection, but often they are unwilling to understand that someone 
who actually knows himself perceives precisely that he is not capa­
ble of anything at all.67
Kierkegaard’s “not capable of anything at all” is of course strikingly similar 
to Kiyozawa’s phrase “Absolute Other Power,” made famous in his essay 
“Zettai tariki no daido ©iNil (Great Path of Absolute Other Power);”
both point to the existential reliance on the infinite, saving other. But one need 
not look to something so abstract to see the confluence of their standpoints. 
In “Waga shinnen (My Faith),” Kiyozawa expresses what may truly be called 
a Kierkegaardian reflection of how his “graduation” from an ethical ex­
istence, with his own version of the teleological terror of social duty, came 
when he realized the impossibility of constructing himself and the world based 
solely on reason:
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In the past I, too, feared that if we did not clarify the norms forjudg­
ing truth or good and evil, that heaven and earth would crumble and 
society would become unmanageable. But now I have reached the 
conclusion that human knowledge could never create standards for 
truth or goodness.68
68 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 333.
69 Kierkegaard 1992b, p. 322.
70 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 215.
For his part, Kierkegaard occasionally makes statements that sound like he 
read the Tannishd:
[SJomeone who is conscious that he is capable of nothing at all has 
every day and every moment the desired and irrefragable opportu­
nity of experiencing that God lives.69
In other words, the inability to succeed in the ethical sphere creates a special 
receptivity to the religious sphere, and the receptivity to the religious sphere 
creates a new, religious sense of ethics and morality. Kiyozawa puts it like 
this:
Self-reflection is what awakens us to the fact of our being finite and 
imperfect, and this awakening to being finite and imperfect in the 
end is what enables us to perceive (BO) the truth. In this way the 
relationship between finite and Infinite is what brings us to the 
attainment of faith in the Infinite, and the result of this faith in other 
power is sympathy for our fellow man, and as this sympathy devel­
ops into morality, it eventually expands to where it will bring us to 
a truly peaceful civilization.70
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